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An Awareness of What Is Missing:  
Four Views on the Consequences of Secularism 
 
 Rachel Hunt-Steenblik, Heidi Zameni, Debbie Ostorga, and Nathan Greeley 
Claremont Graduate University 
 
Abstract 
 
While the issues regarding widespread secularization in contemporary Western culture are 
difficult to properly assess, it can be argued that certain prerequisites are necessary for the well-
being of any society and, furthermore, that certain of these necessary conditions are only 
provided by a given civilization's major religious tradition. All societies need to perpetually 
engage in collective action and decision making, and as any given community faces the 
challenges of the future, its governing religious worldview is an indispensable source of 
guidance and time-honored wisdom. With this in mind, it will be argued that Western civilization 
is dependent upon a Judeo-Christian orientation for its ongoing vibrancy, integrity, and 
sustainability as a culture. When the background of shared values and norms provided by 
Judaism and Christianity no longer functions in any unifying capacity, society loses its sense of 
identity and purpose, and impoverishment in many areas of human life and endeavor is felt and 
observed. Something—whether it is described as value, order, meaning, community, or charity—
goes missing. This diminishment will be analyzed with respect to four different Western fields of 
study: philosophy, literature, politics, and education. 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
It can be argued that certain prerequisites are necessary for the well-being of any society, and 
that certain of these necessary conditions are only provided by a society's major religious 
tradition. All societies engage in collective action and decision making, and, as any given society 
faces the challenges of the future, its governing religious worldview is an indispensable source of 
guidance and time-honored wisdom. It will be argued in the four sections of this paper that 
Western civilization is dependent upon a Jewish-Christian orientation for its ongoing vibrancy, 
integrity, and sustainability. As a corollary, when the background of shared values and norms 
provided by Judaism and Christianity no longer functions in any unifying capacity, the society 
dependent on those values and norms loses its sense of identity and purpose, and 
impoverishment in many areas of human life and endeavor is felt and observed. Something—
whether it is described as value, order, meaning, community, or charity—goes missing.  
In the following, this loss will be analyzed with respect to four different areas of modern 
Western society. Engaging with Jürgen Habermas and some of his interlocutors, Rachel Hunt 
Steenblik will discuss in the first section how politics needs religion to provide the pre-political 
assumptions that make a successful politics possible. The second section will feature an analysis 
by Heidi Zameni of the ways in which the teaching of literature is adversely affected when 
religious understanding and religious values are excluded as tools of interpretation and 
assessment. In the third section, Debbie Ostorga will comment on the changing sense of purpose 
governing the increasingly secularized university. For centuries universities were institutions 
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committed to preserving and promoting the highest values and ideals of Western society; today 
universities are often drearily practical in their focus. The moral vision has flown. Lastly, Nathan 
Greeley will attempt to show why morality is not, properly speaking, morality without God. 
 
Rachel Hunt-Steenblik — An Awareness of What is Missing in the Political Sphere 
 
 In An Awareness of What is Missing: Faith and Reason in a Post-Secular Age, renowned 
philosopher Jürgen Habermas, and others, consider what reason is missing when faith is absent, 
particularly in the political sphere. They recognize that secular society’s tendency to handily 
dismiss faith in praise of reason is no longer sufficient for our post-secular society. Indeed, these 
thinkers see a “renewed visibility of religion” that must be accounted for (Reder and Schmidt 1). 
While religious institutions have changed during the “modern and postmodern eras...they 
nevertheless remain a phenomenon of major social importance” (1). This is especially evident in 
western societies, where the influence of religion is persistently found in the political domain, in 
political conversations, as well as in the more quotidian social domain. Consequently, religion 
retains its social significance, which in turn adds to its political significance.  
It becomes important to ask what role religion has in these societies, for citizens of 
various religions, or for those who consider themselves non-religious. This question takes on 
even greater weight for those concerned with “society as a whole,” and have noticed that religion 
does play a social role (4). 
Much of Habermas’s discussion concerns the discursive relationship between reason and 
faith, and what he perceives as a deeply troubling gap in the interlocutors’ discourse. Within this 
framework, he extends tailored invitations to both secular and spiritual persons. Reason is 
challenged to reflect upon itself, and consider precisely what it is missing in relation to faith. It is 
also invited to remember its shared history with religion (manifested, in part, from Augustine to 
Thomas). Faith, on the other hand, is called to “translate the contents of religious language into a 
secular one and thus...make them accessible to all” (7). Both “partners in the dialogue” are 
invited to be charitable to the other, and take one another seriously, “in particular regarding their 
core convictions” (14). Only then may they enter into a genuine discourse which can benefit 
whole societies and states. 
When Habermas speaks of reason in terms of what is missing, he alludes to a particular 
kind of deficiency. Reason does not lack something that it cannot have, but “something which it 
could have but does not and which it painfully misses” (Brieskorn 26). This something that is 
primarily lost and needs to be recovered is none other than the human element: “Among the 
modern societies, only those that are able to introduce into the secular domain the essential 
contents of their religious traditions which point beyond the merely human realm will also be 
able to rescue the substance of the human” (Habermas, Politik 142). This may be because 
humans are endowed with more than brains, minds, and logic; they are also endowed with hearts, 
feelings, and intuition. 
A reason that reflects “on the religious” is not only capable of recovering the essentially 
human: it can also develop a more accurate understanding of history. Likewise, faith elucidates 
that history is interwoven with a religious element, and that no world or local history would be 
complete without inclusion of the sacred in the lives of its people. Religion is intimately and 
inextricably tied to the world’s events, as well as to the world’s ideas, so much so that we are 
unable to comprehend the “central concepts of the history of ideas” if we ignore that they arose 
in many instances from “religious convictions” (Reder and Schmidt 5). 
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Still, this precursory understanding is not enough. “In addition to this historical 
knowledge,” philosophy should learn that religions “maintain indispensable semantic elements 
which differ fundamentally from” itself “and which may be important for the just ordering of 
modern societies” (4-5). Welcoming faith into the public and political spheres can help aid 
reason in this “just ordering.” 
It becomes clear that faith and knowledge “stand in a reciprocal relation” (6). Each are 
needed in responding to society’s most pressing “social questions such as those posed by 
bioethics.” Religion “proves to be an important moral resource in this context,” for religious 
citizens are able to ‘justify moral questions’ in a way that pure reason is not. Indeed, they possess 
unique “access to a potential” for delineating these crucial queries (6). The “meaning endowing 
function” of religion contributes a moral foundation for public dialogue and therefore plays an 
essential role in “the public sphere” (6). 
Moreover, a democracy depends on many things that cannot be legislated or commanded. 
Among these are “moral stances” arising from “pre-political sources,” including religious modes 
of living. All majority decisions made in democracies rely on the “prior ethical convictions of 
their citizens.” This is true in part because each participant enters the political sphere carrying 
previously acquired ideologies and beliefs. It is neither preferable nor possible for politics to 
separate citizens from their preconceived moral intuitions. Indeed, these pre-political sources act 
in two important functions, first, “for democracy as a background,” and second, as a strong 
“source of motivation,” even though they are unable to serve as ‘normative guidelines for the 
democratic’ process (7). 
 
Habermas explains this further in a discussion with Pope Benedict XVI: 
Citizens are expected to make active use of their rights to communication and to 
participation, not only in what they rightly take to be their own interests, but also with an 
orientation to the common good. This demands a more costly commitment and 
motivation, and these cannot simply be imposed by law. For example, in a democratic 
constitutional state, a legal obligation to vote would be just as alien as a legal requirement 
to display solidarity. All one can do is suggest to the citizens of a liberal society that they 
should be willing to get involved on behalf of fellow citizens whom they do not know 
and who remain anonymous to them and that they should accept sacrifices that promote 
common interests. 
 
This is why both political and moral virtues “are essential if democracy is to exist” (Habermas 
and Ratzinger, 30). 
Modern reason understands “the universalistic and egalitarian concepts of morality and 
law which shape the freedom of the individual and interpersonal relations” (Habermas, “An 
Awareness” 18). Nevertheless, the choice to “engage in action based on solidarity when faced 
with threats which can be averted only by collective effort calls for more than insight into good 
reasons” (18-19). Only religion preserves the images “of the moral whole... as collectively 
binding ideals,” thus demonstrating the greatest limitation of practical reason (19). 
This same reason “fails to fulfill its own vocation when it no longer has sufficient 
strength to awaken, and to keep awake, in the minds of secular subjects, an awareness of the 
violations of solidarity throughout the world,” what Habermas describes as “an awareness of 
what is missing,” and “of what cries out to heaven” (19). What is needed is a “mode of 
legitimation founded on convictions,” as well as the “support of reasons which can be accepted 
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in a pluralistic society by religious citizens, by citizens of different religions, and by secular 
citizens alike” (20). 
Religion is called upon to open up its content, to “recognize for reasons of its own the 
neutrality of the state towards world-views, the equal freedom of all religious communities, and 
the independence of the institutionalized sciences” (21). The state should not require its citizens 
to “split their existence into public and private parts, for example by obliging them to justify 
their stances in the political arena” purely “in terms of non-religious reasons” (21). First, there is 
always a blurring between a person’s motivations, making any division artificial at best. Second, 
a religious person should be allowed to be religiously motivated, even in the political realm.  
As stated by Habermas, religiously “justified stances” should be granted “a legitimate 
place in the public sphere,” manifesting that the “political community officially recognizes that 
religious utterances can make a meaningful contribution to clarifying controversial questions of 
principle” (22). Religious persons become responsible for making their utterances 
understandable in “a publicly accessible language.” They must also accept the “authority of 
‘natural’ reason as the fallible results of the institutionalized sciences and the basic principles of 
universalistic egalitarianism in law and morality” (16). Secular persons become responsible “not 
to treat religious expressions as simply irrational. Further, “secular reason may not set itself up as 
the judge concerning truths of faith, even though in the end it can accept as reasonable only what 
it can translate into its own, in principle universally, accessible, discourses” (22; 16). 
As both reason and faith reflect upon the limits of their own positions, needed learning 
and communication can take place. This allows the two distinct sides to speak “with one 
another” rather than “merely about one another,” which Habermas perceives as a profound 
difference (16). The most essential thing, for Habermas, is that human beings “foster a 
willingness to communicate” together “on the basis of a reason that unites them and possesses 
authority for them” (Reder and Schmidt 10). Language and discourse become the keys. The 
French philosopher, Emanuel Levinas, pointed out that it is through language that we are able to 
have relationships of peace, where neither party is absolved into the other, but can remain 
absolute, Habermas reveals that it is through language that neither faith nor reason are 
assimilated into the other. Reason, if reasonable enough, will engage with faith to promote 
political peace and unity in the public sphere, and will foster the “motivation to show solidarity” 
that comes so easily to religion (Brieskorn 29). Reason, rightly applied, will also develop a better 
understanding of history, and rescue the essentially human. 
 
Heidi Zameni — Prose without a Soul: The Secularization of Literary Studies 
 
 Until recently, literature and religion have enjoyed a comfortable relationship. 
Throughout the history of Western civilization, literature was an important aspect of an 
education. Precepts and moral guides were written into stories, poetry, and dramas, in order to 
reinforce society’s common values. The Old Testament, the Greek and Norse myths, the 
Bhagavad Gita, and other early works indicate that the original authors and the intended 
audiences thought less about the literary value of their texts and more about their religious worth 
(Tennyson and Ericson 9). In Thomas Carlyle’s 1841 seminal collection of orations On Heroes, 
Hero Worship and the Heroic in History, he explains the importance of the “Man of Letters”: “I 
many a time say, the writers of Newspapers, Pamphlets, Poems, Books, these are the real 
working effective Church of a modern country. . . . How much more [the writer], who says, or in 
any way brings home to our heart the noble doings, feelings, darings and endurances of a brother 
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man! He has verily touched our hearts as with a live coal from the altar. Perhaps there is no 
worship more authentic” (188). Later on during the same lectures, Carlysle reemphasizes the 
point: “Books are our Church too” (189). For Carlyle and others of his day, literature offered a 
spiritual light mirroring a religious perspective.  
Literature has long since lost that primacy. Our increasingly naturalistic-oriented society 
has secularized our approach to the study and discussion of literature. We are an academy which 
revels in man’s ability to create meaning through statistics, facts, textual analysis—scientifically 
verifiable data—instead of a metaphysical pursuit of knowledge. The idea that there could be any  
critical understanding gained from a religious perspective has been set aside, but this has come at 
a high cost. As Ryken so aptly puts it, “Western culture has emphasized the person as worker 
(the Reformation tradition and Marx) and the person as thinker (Aquinas and Descartes). And the 
result in the words of Harvey Cox is that 'man's celebrative and imaginative faculties have 
atrophied. . . . His shrunken psyche is just as much a victim of industrialization as were the bend 
bodies of those luckless children who were once confined to English factories from dawn to 
dusk'" (Ryken 19). If we accept the secularization of literary studies, we have nothing to balance 
our postmodern angst. When the metaphysical needs of man or woman are removed, only 
impoverishment of spirit is left. Criticism is left vaporous. The sense of mystery vanishes. In the 
words of Flannery O’Connor “[i]t is the business of fiction to embody mystery . . . , and mystery 
is a great embarrassment to the modern mind” (124).The mystery of which O’Connor speaks is 
that of our existential condition. Literature in the hands of a talented artist reveals that central 
mystery. Leaving out expressions of compassion, piety, grace, morality, and other metaphysical 
concerns, modern literary criticism has lost its heart. 
The secularization of the religious in English literature began in Early Modern England, 
with King Henry VIII’s edict, declaring a separation from papal authority and the creation of  a 
new Church of England. David Cressy and Lori Anne Ferrell explain that during this period 
religion “permeated every aspect of English society. . . . Public and private affairs alike were 
deeply infused by religion” (1). In studying the literature of the time, they found that “many of 
[the] texts reveal diametrically opposed impulses: the search for a faith that convinced the 
intellect, and for a religion that satisfied the heart” (2).  While we may not agree that the two 
impulses (faith and intellect) are antithetical, it is clear that the Early Modern citizens were a 
staunchly religious body, and they viewed literature and life from within a metaphysical context. 
This viewpoint changed dramatically in the nineteenth century when worldviews shifted 
toward a naturalistic outlook. The “scientific method” became the preeminent way of knowing 
about our world, replacing religion as the receptacle of truth. Old ways of looking at literature 
gave way to modern literary theory. Being able to deconstruct a text using scientific, even 
esoteric, methodologies was seen as the pinnacle of scholarly pursuits. The Judeo-Christian ethos 
was replaced with a secular one. As George Marsden explains, it is not that academia is now 
“hostile to religion; but the norm for people to be fully accepted in academic culture is to act as 
though their religious beliefs had nothing to do with education. Scholars are expected to analyze 
subjects such as the nature of reality, beauty, truth, morality, the just society, the individual, and 
the community [all topics discussed in literature classes today] as though deeply held religious 
beliefs had no relevance to such topics” (23-24). How does this secularization operate in a 
literature classroom today? John C. Green gives an excellent example: 
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If a professor talks about studying something from a Marxist point of view, others  
might disagree but not dismiss the notion. But if a professor proposed to study  
something from a Catholic or Protestant point of view, it would be treated like 
proposing something from a Martian point of view (qtd. in Marsden 7). 
 
The epistemological value of religious convictions in the study of literature has been dismissed. 
Other viewpoints, such as feminism, Marxism, and Freudian analysis, are found to be more 
reliable in the pursuit of truth. We have, in Marsden’s words, reached a point where “in the name 
of multiculturalism we have silenced some of our major sub-cultures” (32).  
 Problems arise, however, when the soul of literature is taken out, replaced by the 
hegemony of moral relativism. Since no universal ethical or moral boundaries exist, the catch 
phrase “what’s true for you” becomes the default guideline by which we evaluate a text. In other 
words, anything goes as long as a viewpoint is secular. Never one to mince words, C.S. Lewis 
aptly describes this problem of secularization in his The Abolition of Man or Reflections on 
Education with Special Reference to the Teaching of English in the Upper Forms of Schools.i In 
this, Lewis attempted to “tackle nothing less than the hegemony of relativism in modern western 
culture.” He found that this “subjectivism was most apparent and dangerous in epistemology” 
(Travers 109). Lewis quotes Confucius in his epigraph: “The Master said, He who sets to work 
on a different stand destroys the whole fabric.” In other words, to destroy man’s traditional 
values results in the abolition of man.  
Lewis begins by analyzing an English grammar book popular in England during his time. 
He decries the author’s “debunking” of truth and emphasis on indoctrination. Lewis posits that 
this type of pedagogy teaches “nothing about letters” (the actual subject of the textbook) and 
instead cuts out the soul of the child “long before he is old enough to choose.” Lewis calls this 
the work of the “amateur philosopher where [we] expected the work of professional 
grammarians” (23). In other words, what children are being taught is a philosophical and ethical 
outlook on life that has replaced universal moral law with subjective, false sentiments. Lewis 
goes on to explain that, until modern history, there was an understanding amongst humanity that 
“certain attitudes are really true, and others really false, to the kind of thing the universe is and 
the kind of things we are” (29). It is within this framework wherein most children were educated 
and laws were created. Ethics demanded a universal code, a law, an order, and this was taught in 
schools. However, this has no longer become the case: “Where the old initiated, the new merely 
‘conditions’” (32). Thus, relativism found its foothold. Lewis found this new type of education 
worrisome and indoctrinating.  
 Lewis cites Plato in his Republic wherein Plato offers that “Reason [the head] in man 
must rule the mere appetites [the belly] by means of the ‘spirited element’ [the chest]” (34). 
From Lewis’s viewpoint, Western civilization, as evidenced in the modern English grammar 
book, has been pushed outside of the Greek philosopher’s framework. In Lewis’s words, they 
“remove the organ and demand the function. We make men without chests [spirit/soul] and 
expect of them virtue and enterprise” (35). The result— a purely subjective morality. 
 Lewis succinctly states the goal of such a warped teaching of literature: “[T]he whole 
purpose of [the pedagogue's grammar] book is so to condition the young reader that he will share 
their approval” (40). The relativism taught is only the subjective viewpoint of those in power, of 
those teaching such ideologies to the young. In other words, the strict skepticism of values, in 
particular traditional ones, is only surface level; it is only to be used on other people’s values and 
not one’s own: “A great many of those who ‘debunk’ traditional . . . values have in the 
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background values of their own which they believe to be immune from the debunking process. 
They claim to be cutting away the parasitic growth of emotion, religious sanction, and inherited 
taboos, in order that ‘real’ or ‘basic’ values may emerge” (42).ii This debunking gives way to the 
secularization of literary studies. 
Referring to the new grammar lessons, Lewis sums up, “The Innovator attacks traditional 
values (what he calls the Tao) in defense of what he at first supposes to be (in some special 
sense) ‘rational’ or ‘biological’ values” (53-54). Lewis defines the Tao as “Natural Law, 
Traditional Morality or the First Principles of Practical Reason or the First Platitudes” and argues 
that it is not one among many systems of truth or systems of value: it is the only source of all 
value judgments (56)iii. Historically, education through literature endeavored to produce the kind 
of student prescribed by the Tao. This was a universal norm espoused by traditional educators. 
Contrarily, moral relativists now produce values that are only “natural phenomena” and 
judgments that are conditioned (74). The problem is this: “Nature, untrammeled by values, rules 
the conditioners and, through them, all humanity. . . .” (80). This anti-metaphysical way of 
evaluating literature takes the beauty away: “The stars do not become Nature till we can weigh 
and measure them: the soul does not become Nature till we can psycho-analyse her” (83). The 
resultant exclusion of the religious viewpoint isn’t so much the discrimination against a religious 
scholarly approach (although that might be the case), but that religion’s approach is seen as less 
intellectual. Faith-informed scholarship is deemed intrinsically inferior. 
What would literary criticism and the teaching of literature look like if a religious 
viewpoint was acknowledged? First, it would not mean the favoring of one author over another 
due to his/her religious perspective, the interpreting of historic literature through God’s 
providential intervention, or the quoting of scripture in class. It would not be proselytizing. 
Rather, it would mean making a place for the Judeo-Christian or religious scholar—to allow that 
worldview to have equal standing among others. This would not mean that scholars with a 
religious perspective should churn out sentimental gibberish. They should adhere to the common 
standards of literary criticism and pedagogical practices. This also means that no professor 
should use his or her position as a religious soap box. Fairness and tolerance of opinions would 
still be expected. What we are arguing for, then, is the inclusion of a religious voice and of the 
value of that presence. The silencing of any one worldview has serious implications, particularly 
when that view is one that has been considered traditionally of value. T.S. Eliot states, “The 
whole of modern literature is corrupted by what I call Secularism, that it is simply unaware of, 
simply cannot understand the meaning of, the primacy of the supernatural over the natural life: of 
something which I assume to be our primary concern” (28). It is in the belief of a metaphysical 
world, or at least the acknowledgement of the possibility of one, wherein we can meet the needs 
of the twenty-first century student of literature and the field of contemporary literary criticism.   
 
Debbie Ostorga — Moral Development of College Students 
  
 The moral development of its students was one of the chief purposes of the colonial 
college.  Thelin states that in colonial colleges “all learning ultimately was to coalesce into the 
values and actions of a Christian gentlemen” (Thelin 24). However, despite the fact that moral 
development was central to its purpose. Thelin asserts that “it is not evident that the values 
espoused by the Puritan college builders were especially humane or tolerant…college founders 
were impatient or at best indifferent to disagreements within Congregationalism and 
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Presbyterianism, and they were downright hostile toward Anglicanism and Roman Catholicism” 
(29).  
 Families who sent their sons to college where very concerned about their moral training 
and believed that colleges should provide that training. Thelin states that “by the eighteenth 
century the college had supplemented and perhaps replaced the family as the transmitter of social 
lessons” (25). Around the turn of the twentieth century many institutions U.S. higher education 
began to abandon their religious affiliations. Furthermore, the history of higher education reveals 
that, concurrently, moral development went from the center of university (its classrooms) to the 
margins (the extracurricular) (Marsden; Reuben). Many scholars have noted that the growing 
lack of moral development was a result of the secularization of the university. Today most 
universities espouse the importance of developing a student’s moral character; however 
universities are missing what the colonial colleges had, a theistically founded morality.   
Colonial colleges were founded by various Christian denominations, as universities had 
been since medieval times.  They educated only 1% of the population (Thelin 20). The small 
minority that attended colonial colleges are described by Thelin as “aristocrats, who love liberty 
and hate equality.”  For most, concerns about moral training were a priority. Theological training 
was not, however, the main mission of these colleges according to Thelin; colonial colleges did 
not even award degrees in divinity (27).  Thelin states that governors in various colonies hoped 
“that college alumni who became clergy would provide an antidote to the threat of uneducated or 
‘unlettered’ revivalist preachers…[governors] were concerned that ‘enthusiasm’ not reasoned 
belief would come to dominate colonial religion and society” (28).  Despite its religious 
underpinnings, by the end of the nineteenth century classes in religious and moral philosophy 
disappeared from the curriculum and courses devoted to religion and morality declined (Reuben 
115).    
This decline concerned many university leaders who began to struggle with ways to 
develop the student’s moral character.  William Adams Brown, who was a provost at Yale in the 
early twentieth century cites the importance of curricular cohesion and asserts that “Christian 
faith provides to bring unity and consistency into man’s thought of the universe” (qtd. in 
Longfield 160).   
Some universities attempted to maintain the unity of the curriculum by going back to the 
classical liberal education model (Reuben 236). They believed that free and open inquiry lead to 
specialized disciplines, which in their view lacked any overarching themes or connections to one 
another (237). However, the attempts to address the lack of curricular unity and 
overspecialization failed. Reuben states “the aims of curricular reforms as twofold: to restore 
unity and moral purpose to college education and to promote a higher level of scholarship among 
undergraduates” (238). A liberal arts curriculum, they believed, would be best suited to develop 
a student moral character. However, the faculty opposed this change in curricular offerings.  
Reuben asserts “after failing to create a modern source of moral training, faculty were more 
willing to abandon the principle of unity than to stray too far from the principle of freedom and 
the practice of specialized scholarship” (243).  In the end curricular reforms failed in creating a 
common course of study which was unifying and cultivated morality.     
The lack of religious traditions and unity at the turn of the twentieth century coupled with 
the expansion of higher education was a catalyst for new universities to create the “collegiate 
way” or “college life” which was to be the new unifying factor (255). Some of the markers of 
college life were the development of college sports, college colors, college mascots, college 
hymns. These aspects of college life began to make the schools unique from one another. The 
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replacement of religious traditions with college traditions at the turn of the century reflects the 
secularization of U.S. universities. It was believed that group identity could serve as the most 
effective moral influence on students. Rueben asserts that at that time morality became identified 
with behavior rather than belief (268). Thelin asserts that “the elaborate extracurricular of 
athletics teams and musical groups later associated with the ‘collegiate way’ were not part of the 
true colonial colleges” (Thelin 22). Simultaneously, student affairs professionals were added to 
the university workforce. Reuben asserts “commitment to student services reflected their 
growing belief that the moral value of a university education resided in the community life of 
students, not in their formal education” (Reuben 225). Student affairs were responsible for 
upholding the school standards, overseeing the extracurricular and moral development of 
students. Currently, the function of student affairs professionals is essentially the same as it was 
then. There is a clear distinction between student and academic affairs. Student affairs 
professionals deal with issues of student misconduct ranging from academic dishonesty to sexual 
assault. For example, most campuses have established protocols to deal with a breach in 
university standards such as academic dishonesty.  
Moral development, whether influenced by secular values or theistic values, is always 
reflective of what is socially acceptable during a particular time period. The current issue of New 
Directions for Higher Education is entitled “Facilitating the moral growth of college students”.  
In this issue student affair professionals write about ways to promote student moral development.  
Stewart asserts that “engaging in difficult dialogues and practicing patience, compassion and 
forgiveness assist with the continual development of moral maturity” (Stewart 70). One could 
argue that these principles of patience, compassion, and forgiveness come out of Christianity. 
One could also argue that the lack of theistic based morality may limit the way in which students 
develop moral character.   
The debate in higher education about the importance of character and moral development 
is still important. Nicgorski asserts that “moral education is the most important part, the very 
substance, of socialization” (Nicgorski 21). Early college leaders were also concerned with this; 
they believed they had a moral mission which was the wellbeing of society (166). The difference 
is that today, many in the academy believe that morality based on science is more authoritative 
than morality based on religion (171). Habermas warns of the ill that may result in the political 
sphere when religion and reason are not in conversation with one another. This concern also 
applies to universities. Habermas implies that people in the post-modern world miss the morality 
that comes with theological insight. Habermas states that “religious utterances can make a 
meaningful contribution of clarifying controversial questions of principle” (Habermas, “An 
Awareness” 22). University leaders and others in the academy who are dismissive of religiously 
founded values fail to recognize the value that these insights can bring to a conversation. 
Colonial colleges started off with a theistically based morality. The very mission of those 
schools was reflected in this. However, U.S. colleges went through a period of expansion and 
transition at the end of the nineteenth century. During this transition moral training was moved to 
the margins. Now the issue is whether universities, by marginalizing morality and a Christian 
worldview, has lost their ability to develop a student’s moral character? Will they learn from 
previous university leaders; leaders who recognized that the loss of a theistically founded 
morality is not only a disservice to the student’s moral growth but also to the strength of the 
society which will eventually be led by those same students? 
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Nathan Greeley — The Dependence of Morality upon Theism 
 The notion of a necessary relationship between theism and morality is a hotly contested 
one today. Whereas in the not so distant past, it was thought that a necessary relationship 
between the two was quite self-evident, this consensus has dramatically eroded over the past two 
centuries. Most philosophers in our contemporary world consider the view that morality’s 
possession of sense and intelligibility is inconceivable without a transcendent underpinning to be 
no more than a relic of a past age. The sense or meaning of morality is now attributed to any 
number of mundane and empirical realities, most having to do with the social utility of various 
norms and values. It will be the purpose of this section to argue that morality requires a 
definition that makes the acts of human beings either objectively moral or immoral, and that the 
only means of securing such a definition is to argue that the moral order is established by the 
ultimate authority, namely God.    
 In Western thought, the disassociation of theism and morality stems from Enlightenment 
criticisms, arguments that made belief in God seem to be an impossibility. These skeptical 
arguments, found in the writings of Hume, Voltaire, Lessing, and others, are now part of our 
common cultural inheritance, and need not be rehearsed here. What is significant for the 
purposes of this essay is that for many philosophers and ethicists, these arguments dictated 
finding a naturalistic basis for the sense and meaning of morality as the conceptions of morality 
derived from theistic natural law or divine command were deemed incredible and untenable. 
Most modern thinkers, regardless of their less than enthusiastic regard for naturalistic ethical 
conceptions, have arrived at the conclusion that dictates that nothing better is available, and 
hence that theistic critiques of naturalistic ethics, even when acute and incisive, cannot be taken 
too seriously. Due to this oftentimes happy resignation, the paradigm shift to naturalistic ethics 
is, in many quarters, today a fait accompli. Yet the rethinking of the basis of morality found in 
naturalistic ethics raises some important questions that should not be too hastily brushed aside. It 
is important, I would argue, that we reach a high degree of clarity with respect to what the 
differences are between theistic and naturalistic conceptions of morality. Only then can it 
become fully evident whether a naturalistic ethics is truly a worthy substitute for theistic 
morality. It is my belief that naturalistic morality is unacceptable as a substitute, precisely 
because the objectivity of morality, so essential to the very definition of morality, goes missing 
on a naturalistic account. This should demand that theism be considered or reconsidered, in spite 
of any prima facie difficulties that such a position entails. 
 To provide perspective, it will be helpful to talk about a specific issue that almost 
everyone agrees is intimately bound up with moral questions. The issue is human rights, a notion 
that I assume the majority of people in the modern West regard as a foundational idea in our 
culture. I pose the following question: can a naturalistic morality fund things like human rights 
and the dignity of persons in a way comparable to a morality rooted in theism? I will argue that it 
cannot, and as a result, I recommend that we consider finding a place for theistic morality if we 
wish to maintain these conceptions, such as human rights, in anything other than a pro forma 
fashion. 
 Following Mark D. Linville, in his essay “The Moral Argument,” I take it as a principle 
of theistic morality that the essential reason why some acts are considered immoral is that they 
violate the intrinsic rights and dignity of human persons (Linville 442-446). From a theistic 
viewpoint, God is the objective provider and guarantor of the rights and dignities that all 
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individuals possess. The reason why murdering, raping, or abusing other persons is morally 
wrong is that these acts violate the inalienable value and rights of persons, rights inherent simply 
by virtue of persons being created as beings possessed of intrinsic worth and dignity. God creates  
persons, i.e., rational and moral creatures who, like God himself, have their own ends and must 
not simply be regarded by other persons as resources or instruments. To do so would be to 
violate their nature qua persons, as people whose lives and ability to make choices and pursue 
goals are God’s gifts (444-445). 
 That being said, the question that should next be raised is whether a like conception of 
persons is available to the committed naturalist. On the assumption that the universe is for all 
intents and purposes equivalent to a cosmic accident, without any objective purpose or value, the 
question becomes how objective purpose and value can ever emerge at any stage of its 
development. As Linville states, “the naturalist’s obstacles in accounting for the dignity of 
persons are at least threefold, and they are interlocked: how to derive the personal from the 
impersonal, how to derive values from a previously valueless universe, and how to unite the 
personal and the valuable with the result of a coherent and plausible notion of personal dignity” 
(443). We have already stated how theism manages to do this: for theism the personal and the 
valuable are not things that inexplicably emerge from a universe lacking these qualities, but 
rather they are there from the beginning, and their being united is a result of their having God as 
their ground, source, and highest exemplar. The moral order is not something inexplicable that is 
added on to the physical order, but a part of a total order that has been present in God’s person 
and providence from the beginning. The dignity of human persons is thus extant from the 
beginning, existing in the person of God, from whom the dignity of all other persons is derived 
as a gift. 
Stated like this, it may seem quite evident that the conception of persons as explained by 
theism is logically unobtainable by any naturalistic conception of ethics. I believe that such 
immediate impressions are substantially representative of the reality of the matter. Naturalism is 
forced to be reductionist about things like personality and value, because they imagine a nascent 
universe bereft of these things. As a result, notions like intrinsic rights and dignity must, on pain 
of being inconsistent, be dismissed or redefined in some other way. But to do either is to 
acknowledge that they don’t really exist, but are merely social constructions.  
Do we wish to think that human rights are social constructions? That is the unavoidable 
question with which we are faced. Thomas Jefferson, in The Declaration of Independence, is 
quite clear that human rights are natural rights, and that natural rights are God-given rights. In 
contrast, we find today the dominating viewpoint of utilitarianism; it forms the de rigeur ethics 
for modern atheism. What did Jeremy Bentham, the founder of utilitarianism, have to say about 
human rights? He states that “there are no such things as natural rights—no such things as rights 
anterior to the establishment of government—no such things as natural rights opposed to, in 
contradistinction to, legal [rights]” (Bentham 500). In Bentham’s view, rights are the result of 
contingent social arrangements, and do not precede them. According to Bentham, an act is wrong 
not because it violates someone’s intrinsic or natural rights (e.g. the right of human beings at all 
times and in all places not to be murdered or raped) but only because the extant social order is 
such that deeds like murder and rape have been deemed violations of the social contract. In other 
words, the only thing that makes my murdering someone wrong is that the society that I live in 
has determined to consider it so. Were my society to decide differently about what murder is or 
what it consists of, then the definition of rights would have to be reinterpreted. Perhaps on the 
new interpretation, six million Jews would have no rights. 
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  For anyone who insists upon an intrinsic conception of human rights, which would see 
violations of these natural rights as stemming directly from the way that people are themselves 
wronged by such violations, and which would eschew any understanding of human rights as 
having a merely pragmatic or contingent origin, it is evident that utilitarianism, in spite of its 
popularity, is unacceptable. For people who find themselves so disposed, theism, as the ground 
of a non-contingent moral order that establishes intrinsic value for all human persons, is the only 
real alternative, one that demands consideration by anyone who has an interest in preserving a 
conception of human rights and dignity as inherent in all human persons, regardless of 
circumstances or vicissitudes of history.    
I will now sum up what I take to be the upshot of this section. Assuming that order in 
nature is necessary for the objectivity of empirical assertions, I see no reason not to think that a 
principle of order is similarly fundamental for the objectivity of all assertions. Truth, since the 
time of the Greeks, has been understood to be the correspondence of an assertion with reality. If 
there is no reality to which the assertion can correspond, then the basis of that objectivity is 
unfounded. All judgments that do not correspond to reality are by definition false. And so if there 
is no objective moral order to which moral assertions correspond, then no moral assertion can 
possibly be true—all will be opinion, statements of preference no different than those that apply 
to any other arena of subjective taste. There may still be prescriptions about what one should do 
(indeed all naturalistic moral theories have prescriptions) but these will not in fact be moral 
assertions, precisely because there are no moral facts to which they can correspond. Without a 
theistic foundation, we are left with something other than, and less than, morality; namely the 
forced and contractual agreement among persons to behave in certain ways with respect to one 
another. The objective wrongness of actions no longer exists. What is “wrong” with murder, or 
rape, is that the contract is breeched, not that the act of murder or rape is committed. And even 
the breech of said contract is only “wrong” because the power exists to enforce it. 
  It is very important in discussions of morality to be extremely frank about the 
consequences of what happens when theistic morality goes missing. Can a naturalistic ethics 
accomplish what a conception of morality tied to theism can achieve? No. Can it provide a 
meaning for morality as rich and robust as can be provided theistic ethics? No. Is it forced to 
argue that morality is simply a way that contingent power relations between groups and 
individuals are managed and negotiated? Yes. Does morality then become something other than 
morality under such conditions? Yes. Does it, if understood as an unbending guide to timelessly 
right action, go missing? Yes. As I believe has been demonstrated in this section, it is quite easy 
to illuminate the shape that morality finds itself in without God. That shape, unfortunately, is no 
shape at all.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The previous four sections have attempted to show, in various ways, how secularism has 
impacted and continues to impact our culture. The uniform message has been that when religion 
disappears or is severely weakened in its influence, society changes for the worse in many un-
embraceable ways. It has been argued that all problems are at bottom moral and religious 
problems. This means that not only are political, social, pedagogical, and economic problems are 
at root moral and religious problems, but that the solution to these putatively “secular” problems 
will only be available to those who believe in moral and religious norms. Absent of transcendent 
principles, the modern West is in a sorry state, rootless, wandering, unsure of what it is, what it 
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wants, what it should permit, and what it stands for. Without moral and religious norms, the 
result is cultural oblivion, for morality and religion alone give to a culture its most precious 
attribute, namely its memory of its own identity. 
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Notes 
 
1This book was originally published in 1947 from three Riddell Memorial lectures which Lewis 
gave on February 24-26, 1943 at the University of Durham. Lewis and his brother traveled 
during the middle of World War II to deliver the orations. This was the fifteenth lecture given as 
part of the Riddell series. They were established to honor the memory of Sir John Walter 
Buchanan-Riddell and usually discussed the “decline in modern times of belief in an objective 
natural law and a correspondence epistemology” (Travers 108). 
 
2 Lewis lists a few examples from the English textbook that are surreptitiously taught by the 
authors as moral approvals and disapprovals under the guise of a grammar lesson: Disapprovals: 
. . . ‘To call a man a coward tell us really nothing about what he does. . . .’ Feelings about a 
country or empire are feelings ‘about nothing in particular. . . .’ Approvals: Those who prefer the 
arts of peace to the arts of war (it is not said in what circumstances) are such that ‘we may want 
to call them ‘wise men. . . .’ ‘Contact with the ideas of other people is, as we know, healthy.’ 
(Abolition 41) 
 
3 Lewis argues against moral relativism and shows that throughout time, people have held to a 
universal moral law. He is not arguing necessarily for a Judeo-Christian or narrowly Christian 
moral code; instead, it is a moral code (the “Tao”) inherent in all human beings. He augments 
this argument with evidence in his appendix, which lists many examples of Natural Law and uses 
many ancient traditions to prove his point of a universal law. The titles themselves display the 
types of truths he argues are part of the Natural Law or Tao as he calls it: “The Law of General 
Beneficence,” “The Law of Special Beneficence,” “Duties to Parents, Elders, Ancestors,” 
“Duties to Children and Posterity,” “The Law of Justice,” The Law of Good Faith and Veracity,” 
“The Law of Mercy,” and “The Law of Magnanimity.” For example, in the first part of the 
appendix, he cites several ancient sources who believe murder is wrong and the murderer evil--
Ancient Jewish, Hindu, Babylonian, Ancient Chinese, Ancient Egyptian, Old Norse, and so on 
(Abolition 97-100). 
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